Text of The Republic, Book I, 351-354 was transcribed from The Dialogues of Plato, translated by B. Jowett, M.A. Copyright, February 12, 1892, by The Macmillan Company
Copyright renewed, Ferbruary 12, 1920, by the Oxford University Press
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The Republic, Book I, 351-354

Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order
that our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice
may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice
is stronger and more powerful than justice, but now justice, having
been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be
stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance; this can no longer
be questioned by any one. But I want to view the matter, Thrasy-
machus, in a different way: You would not deny that a state may
be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states,
or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of
them in subjection?
True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly
unjust state will be most likely to do so.
I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would
further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the
superior state can exist or be exercised without justice or only with
justice.
If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, than only
with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.
I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you are not only nodding as-
sent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.
That is out of civility to you, he replied.
You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also
to inform me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a
band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could
act at all if they injured one another?
No indeed, he said, they could not.
But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might
act together better?
Yes.
And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and
fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that
true, Thrasymachus?
I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.
How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether
injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing,
among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one an-
other and set them at variance and render them incapable of com-
mon action?
Certainly.
And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel
and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?
They will.
And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wis-
dom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?
Let us assume that she retains her power.
Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature
that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an
army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with,
rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and dis-
traction; and does it not become its own enemy and at variance
with all that opposes it, and with the just? Is not this the case?
Yes, certainly.
And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single per-
son; in the first place rendering him incapable of action because
he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making
him an enemy to himself and the just? Is not that true, Thrasy-
machus?
Yes.
And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?
Granted that they are.
But if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just
will be their friend?
Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I
will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company.
Well then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the re-
mainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are
clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the un-
just are incapable of common action; nay more, that to speak as we
did of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together, is
not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would
have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must
have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to
combine; if there had not been they would have injured one an-
other as well as their victims; they were but half-villains in their
enterprises; for had they been whole villains, and utterly unjust,
they would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I be-
lieve, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But
whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is
a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that
they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still I
should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, noth-
ing less than the rule of human life.
Proceed.
I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a
horse has some end?
I should.
And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which
could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any
other thing?
I do not understand, he said.
Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?
Certainly not.
Or hear, except with the ear?
No.
These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?
They may.
But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel,
and in many other ways?
Of course.
And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the pur-
pose?
True.
May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?
We may.
Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding
my meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything
would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well ac-
complished, by any other thing?
I understand your meaning, he said, and assent.
And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence?
Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?
It has.
And has not the eye an excellence?
Yes.
And the ear has an end and an excellence also?
True.
And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them
an end and a special excellence?
That is so.
Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their
own proper excellence and have a defect instead?
How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?
You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which
is sight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather
ask the question more generally, and only enquire whether the
things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper ex-
cellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their own defect?
Certainly, he replied.
I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own
proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end?
True.
And the same observation will apply to all other things?
I agree.
Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil?
for example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the
like. Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly
be assigned to any other?
To no other.
And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?
Assuredly, he said.
And has not the soul an excellence also?
Yes.
And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived
of that excellence?
She cannot.
Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and super-
intendent, and the good soul a good ruler?
Yes, necessarily.
And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul,
and injustice the defect of the soul?
That has been admitted.
Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust
man will live ill?
That is what your argument proves.
And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill
the reverse of happy?
Certainly.
Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?
So be it.
But happiness and not misery is profitable.
Of course.
Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more
profitable than justice.
Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bend-
idea.
For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown
gentle towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have
not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not
yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is suc-
cessively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to
enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another
without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of jus-
tice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice
is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose a fur-
ther question about the comparative advantages of justice and in-
justice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result
of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I
know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know
whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man
is happy or unhappy.


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