Retrenchment in the 1980s

The Politics of Prestige and Gender

In this article I use data of American Association of University Professors (AAUP) cases dealing with retrenchment reported in Academe between 1980–90. I try to decipher the processes and patterns that characterize retrenchment by asking who controls the process, what does the process look like, what fields and faculty are cut, and why? The theory that guides my interpretation is diverse but related: it is neo-Marxian, postmodernist, and feminist. I interpret patterns of faculty retrenchment in higher education as strongly shaped by the same class-based political/economic conflicts that are restructuring the broader economy. However, I see neo-Marxian theory as not dealing seriously with the professional class and professional labor, a drawback in a period marked by fluidity and chaos for persons claiming middle- or professional-class statuses [4, 35, 82]. I think postmodernists who have roots in the neo-Marxian tradition are a better guide to the uncharted social and economic spaces in which we currently live. They have a keen eye for uncertainty, contradiction, and the social construction of everyday life, especially in the lives of intellectuals, and are not committed to particular endings for any social scripts, let alone to grand narratives [39, 44, 79]. Finally, I think all social and economic theory must be leavened with feminist theory to account for the pervasive, subtle, and surprising gender differences that continue to mark society, postmodern or not [36, 44].

My general line of argument is that the particular phenomenon of faculty retrenchment in postsecondary education can be understood
fully only through reference to broad patterns of redistribution of wealth and power in the wider society. After 1972, higher education was increasingly defined as a state welfare rather than a production function. Access was conceived of as unlimited, making higher education no more than an entitlement program, another state regulated service, one that absorbed increasing amounts of the several states' budgets [50]. As a welfare function, higher education became vulnerable to heavy cutting in the 1980s as states experienced fiscal crisis. Generally, university managers — presidents, chancellors, provosts, deans — responded to fiscal constraint in the same ways that corporate CEOs responded to declines in productivity and foreign competition; they began reorganizing internally, concentrating resources on the divisions they expected to be most profitable.

The reallocation of resources within the university is beginning to restructure the professional labor force. However, not all faculty and fields in the 1980s were treated similarly. University policy makers, confronted with choices about what to cut, made decisions similar to those made by politicians and policy makers participating in the conservative ethos of the Reagan and Bush administrations: they privileged faculty and fields able to position themselves close to the market. They tried to emphasize more strongly universities' production functions. Faculty and fields unable or unsuccessful in claiming a position close to the market were more likely to be cut. Although position of faculty and field in relation to market sounds like the result of rational choice, I argue that this position is socially constructed by faculty and administrators, sometimes with little relation to free markets.

Theory

The retrenchment literature is by and large written from an organizational efficiency perspective and is concerned primarily with economy and efficiency achieved by management of discrete organizational entities [6, 16, 71]. There is almost no longitudinal data on retrenchment, nor is there a great deal of cross-institutional data. There is very little consideration of retrenchment in relation to institutions and organizations other than universities and colleges [for exceptions, see 73, 74, 75].

Initially, the literature on retrenchment assumed that higher education spending would revive and concentrated on temporary measures that postponed expenditures and eliminated nonessential personnel [59]. When institutions were forced to cut faculty selectively, scholars offered political theories to explain patterns of retrenchment; the programs most likely to be cut were those without political strength to resist re-
trenchment within the university community [57]. As cuts deepened, rational choice theory, embedded in strategic planning for downsizing, prescribed and explained retrenchment as a process through which low-enrollment programs were weeded out and programs central to institutional missions were strengthened [43, 5, 6, 17]. Although theories that rest on efficiency and centrality to mission are currently the most widely accepted explanations for retrenchment patterns, they are inadequate because they do not explain the 1980s data. Those data, which will be dealt with later in this article, indicate that retrenchment fell disproportionately on the humanities, fine arts, social sciences, and education. Many of these fields continue to have high enrollments; they are certainly not universally "weak"; and all, in most circumstances, can be conceived of as central to most institutional missions, especially to the liberal education of undergraduates.

Because I began to see the ability of a field to position itself close to the market or to define itself as productive as a key to procuring resources within the university, I thought human capital theory might offer an explanation for the patterns of retrenchment in the 1980s. Perhaps individual investment in some fields of study paid off more handsomely than it did in others, and those that provided low returns were the fields that were cut. However, human capital theory generally measures return on higher education in terms of highest degree attained, not in terms of fields, and thus cannot address the patterns of retrenchment in relation to various fields and subfields [51].

If human capital theory cannot explain recent patterns of retrenchment because it does not disaggregate degrees by field, perhaps the way a field relates to the unlettered workings of the market provides an adequate explanation. Perhaps fields in which there are few graduates and high market (job) demand are able to avoid retrenchment and benefit from internal reallocation of resources [14]. This explanation works well for the physical sciences and engineering, so long as the nature of the market is not considered. The greatest determinant of demand for scientists and engineers is not the private sector economy, but Department of Defense spending patterns [52, 56]. If the market is conceived of as an entity other than government, its workings cannot account very well for a number of high-demand fields in higher education.

Neo-Marxian theory would probably try to explain retrenchment by situating it in the broader political economy. Unlike organizational efficiency or rational choice theorists, neo-Marxians would look beyond the institution or the class of institutions in question to see how retrenchment related to changes in the class structure and the polity [72, 73, 74, 75, 76]. Unlike human capital or market theorists, neo-Marxian theo-
rists would not assume free and rational markets, but would look to discover how changes in professional labor markets were connected to changes in the class structure and political economic power [41, 48]. Moreover, neo-Marxians would look at these changes over time.

The major changes in the political economy in the past two decades were the emergence of a powerful conservative political movement, symbolized by the Reagan and Bush administrations, and the reconcentration of economic resources on the top 20 percent of the population, and especially on the top half of one percent [80, 37, 64]. According to Kevin Phillips, during Reagan's terms, "federal policy favored the accumulation of wealth and rewarded financial assets. . . . No parallel upsurge of riches had been seen since the late nineteenth century, the era of the Vanderbilts, Morgans and Rockefellers"[64, p. 10, emphasis in original].

In trying to explain changes in higher education in the past decade, neo-Marxians would first look to broad changes such as those described by Phillips and others [8, 37, 82]. Over-attributing agency to elites, neo-Marxians would expect to see similarities between the discourse of corporate CEOs and educational managers and read that discourse as a prelude to action [35, 76, 82]. I too expected to find evidence of alignment of postsecondary and corporate sectors in the discourse of higher education leaders. I thought educational managers and CEOs would share a discourse that emphasized crisis, the need to make tough decisions, maintain competitiveness, and increase productivity. Indeed, the initial question I asked of my data was whether or not educational managers used the same rhetoric as their corporate counterparts.

If there were a shared discourse between corporate leaders and educational managers, then I wanted to know if they engaged in the same practices. The reconcentration of wealth in the 1970s and 1980s was achieved primarily by restructuring the well-paid, blue-collar work force. Plants were moved to different regions and overseas, large employers engaged in anti-union campaigns against workers, and as union membership plummeted, employers asked workers for speed-ups, give-backs, reduction of benefits, even pay furloughs [10, 11]. For the production work that remained in the United States, large corporations increasingly fired or retired full-time workers and replaced them with part-timers, more and more of whom were women [7]. Unions were unimaginative in their response to corporate demands, by and large making concessions to protect the privileges of seniority, contributing, perhaps inadvertently, to the emergence of a two-tier work force.

I theorized that continued reconcentration of wealth in the 1990s would depend on a restructuring of the white-collar and professional work force in ways that loosely parallel the restructuring of the blue-
collar work force in the 1970s and 1980s. I expected to see signs of the restructuring of professional labor in the 1980s. In the postsecondary sector, I wanted to see if educational managers faced with financial difficulties began to speed up professional labor, ask for give-backs, reduce benefits, use larger numbers of part-time workers, and engage in tactics that reduced the collegiality and authority of faculty. In other words, I wanted to know if restructuring meant the privileging of managerial decision making and the development of a two-tier workforce in the academy.

If restructuring were occurring, I wanted to know how it was patterned. What fields were being cut, who was being cut, and why? Neo-Marxian theory would expect restructuring to benefit corporate capital, particularly multinational corporate capital. I too expected patterns of retrenchment to benefit fields close to corporate capital, but, under postmodern influence, I also allowed for a great deal of agency on the part of the professional class. I thought that powerful professions and resource rich fields would be better able to locate themselves in the conservative discourse of productivity and place themselves close to the market. Although position of faculty and field in relation to market sounds like the result of rational choice, I argue that position is socially constructed by faculty and administrators. In other words, some faculty and fields, although quite distant from the market in terms of product development and private sector sales, are nonetheless able to claim a close relationship. For example, medicine and law, which depend heavily on the monopolistic structure of those professions for high salaries, nonetheless are able to position themselves close to the market during institutional discourse on retrenchment.

Finally, as a feminist who sees patriarchy as a social formation that is as powerful as class, I wanted to know how women fared during retrenchment. I also wanted to explore the discourse surrounding female majority fields and their relation to the market, and more generally, discourse about women's part in productivity.

_Data and Method_

The data for this article are the cases reported in the Committee A "Academic Freedom and Tenure" section of _Academe_ between January 1980 and December 1990 that deal with retrenchment, financial exigency, alleged financial exigency, or program reduction. _Academe_ is the journal of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). These data are a subset of a larger study of academic freedom cases in the 1980s [78].
The relationship between retrenchment and academic freedom, the primary concern of Committee A, is not immediately obvious. However, academic freedom is irrevocably linked to tenure, and retrenchment cases almost always involve abrogation of tenure, breaches of contract, and violations of academic due process. Many faculty, faced with retrenchment, turn to the AAUP, and their concerns are routed to Committee A.

Committee A reported seventeen retrenchment cases, 35 percent of all academic freedom cases for the decade. Each of the cases represented an institution. The seventeen institutions fired 192 faculty, accounting for 75 percent of the dismissals reported by Committee A between 1980–90. The cases occurred from 1979 to 1986 and were clustered around 1983, a year of deep economic recession.

The AAUP cases do not begin to reflect the number of faculty fired during retrenchments in the 1980s. Rather than numbers, the AAUP cases reflect situations that the AAUP thought were exemplars of problems or representative of important trends. Although the number of faculty covered in the AAUP data was relatively small, the cases were detailed enough to provide information on tenure status, gender, and field of retrenched faculty. Estimates of faculty actually fired during retrenchments in the 1980s range from four thousand to six or seven thousand [66]. There are almost no systematic data on these firings and certainly no information about tenure status, gender, and field of fired faculty.

In terms of control, the seventeen institutions were almost evenly divided between public (9) and private (8). According to the Carnegie Classification, five were Liberal Arts II, one was a Liberal Arts I; three were Comprehensive II, two Comprehensive I; one was a Doctoral Granting II, another a Research I. One institution was a Teacher's College, another a Two-Year College. Only four of the seventeen institutions were organized to bargain collectively, and these were all public institutions [34]. The colleges and universities were located throughout the country, with no strong concentration in any one area. Generally, the colleges and universities were unremarkable and undistinguished.

The document that constitutes a case — the report appearing in Academe — is prepared by an investigating committee with the aid of the AAUP staff. An investigating committee usually consists of two or three persons selected by AAUP staff and Committee A members. As AAUP members in good standing, the members of the investigating committees probably view academic freedom through a lens ground by AAUP beliefs and practices. Their reports are based on examination of available documents and on-campus interviews with faculty and admin-
istrators who are willing to talk to them. The reports often, but not always, include long quotations from the parties involved in retrenchment, providing access to voices that are somewhat independent from the documents' creators. In interpreting these reports, I may make judgments and reach conclusions with which investigating committees, Committee A, and the AAUP may disagree.

As I read each of the seventeen cases, I asked the following questions, which stemmed from my theoretical concerns: (1) What did the discourse of educational managers say about restructuring professional labor in the postsecondary sector? (2) What mechanisms and tactics did managers use in retrenchment; did their practice look like that of corporate CEOs dealing with blue collar labor? (3) How did faculty respond to managerial efforts at retrenchment, especially in terms of traditional faculty governance structures and professional norms related to participation in management? (4) Were there patterns of retrenchment? What fields were cut, what were the social characteristics of the faculty in these fields, and how did they position themselves in relation to the market?

Managerial Voices

The politicians, trustees, presidents, and academic managers involved in these cases all claimed that their institutions faced serious financial problems. However, only one institution claimed a state of financial exigency, and that claim was limited to a particular college [24]. These higher education managers were not dealing with the devastating financial crises of the late 1970s, such as the near bankruptcy of the city of New York, or the large budget shortfalls faced by Northeastern states such as Michigan and Ohio [20, 53]. Instead, managers in the 1980s cases were dealing with institutions that were allegedly financially troubled, but far from closing their doors.

Authority for decision making about retrenchment varied somewhat by control. In private institutions, the trustees or the presidents were responsible, subject to very minor limitations imposed by personnel policy stipulations about faculty consultation. A president could simply announce, as did President Robinson, of Florida Memorial College, that notifications of dismissal were issued because of "'economics and the need to reduce spending' " [21, p. 156]. More starkly, as President Petersen, Westminster College (Utah), said to the Kiwanis Club a year after radically restructuring the faculty, "'Frankly, I took the power from the faculty and gave it to me' " [30, p. 5a].

In public institutions, voters and legislators often played a major part
in setting the scene for retrenchment. In Idaho, it was “agreed that the State . . . generally and public higher education . . . particularly have been in serious financial difficulty since 1978, when the voters approved a 1-percent property tax limitation” [24, p. 3a]. The Idaho legislature tried to reduce higher education’s claim on state resources by introducing bills that attempted to eliminate faculty tenure and mandate salary increases without funding them, forcing the state board and institutional administrators to move toward retrenchment. At the University of Northern Colorado, the legislature was able to fix numerical limits on the number of faculty positions that the institution was awarded. When the legislature reduced the number, the institution was forced to retrench [29]. At Morgan State University, Maryland, legislative audits revealed unexpected deficits in the institutional budget as well as unacceptably high costs, compared to other state institutions, for educating students. “The Maryland legislature, whatever the basis for its action, did authorize the reduction of forty full-time positions at Morgan State University over a two-year period” [32, p. 27].

Voters exercised their authority over public higher education by passing property tax limitations that curtailed state revenues. More directly, legislators tried to achieve what they saw as greater economy and efficiency in higher education by using the power of the purse to precipitate restructuring. By and large, voters and legislators did not attempt to micro-manage colleges and universities. However, in some cases they specified broad areas in which institutions had to cut, singling out, for example, faculty lines. The depth and timing of cuts often were related to state budgetary shortfalls.

The power for making decisions about retrenchment within public institutions was often vested by state boards and state codes in the administration. For example, in California the rules on retrenchment stated that tenured faculty could be laid off only for cause or “for lack of funds or lack of work.” Lack of work could result from

- a judgment by the campus president, after appropriate consultation, that a particular academic program should be reduced or eliminated for academic reasons not necessarily related to budget or demand, such as the loss of accreditation, changing curricular priorities, or the need to maintain a viable and balanced academic program in the University . . . as a whole [25, p. 4]

At Northern Colorado, the university’s Policies and Procedures for Retrenchment stated that faculty could be terminated as “a result of declining enrollment, lack of work, institutional factors or any combination of these factors.” [29, p. 1a] and vested authority for decision making in the administration. The “institutional factors” clause gave the president great
discretion in making decisions. Although consultation with the faculty was mentioned, there were no mechanisms that allowed faculty to vote or veto any decisions made by the administration. Faculty had to be heard, but not necessarily heeded. Essentially, authority for retrenchment resided in presidential or administrative "judgment."

In approaching retrenchment, academic executives frequently used language similar to that used by corporate CEOs in justifying elimination of jobs [76]. Their language was replete with references to crisis, the need to make tough decisions, increase productivity, and maintain competitiveness. The president of Temple University delivered an "urgent message" to the faculty:

He stated that the university budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1982, would show an operating deficit of $1.4 million, and that the university would face an accumulated deficit by the 1984–85 academic year of about $50 million if planning assumptions concerning state appropriations, tuition income, personnel costs, and student enrollment were proven true [31, p. 17].

Similarly, at Morgan State, President Richardson spoke of the staffing crisis we now face. Aggregate student enrollments have dramatically declined by approximately 2,000 students [on a campus of approximately 6,000], resulting in an excess of faculty, which in turn has been exacerbated by a shift in student enrollments among particular departments and a serious imbalance between faculty assignments and student enrollments in certain departments [32, p. 26].

Administrators' proposals for meeting crises always involved decisive action on their part. One "president asserted that 'the gradualist approach' could no longer be continued and . . . 'hard decisions had to be made' " [25, p. 4]. Another said, "it is clear that life cannot go on as usual. . . . It is also clear that, over the next three years, we must reduce the total number of personnel at the institution. There can be no other way. . . . I assure you that the decisions will be made" [31, p. 17, emphasis in original]. An institutional vice president, referring to the abolishment of tenure and retrenchment of the faculty, said, "we gain a tremendous advantage with the public in fund raising and recruiting students by doing something that is bold and imaginative. This is why we are moving quickly" [30, p. 5a].

The object or goal of tough, bold, imaginative decisions was greater economy and efficiency, often achieved through increased productivity. In the words of an institutional vice-president, "The productivity gains that are essential to our financial viability . . . inevitably lead to a surplus of personnel and the necessity of reducing our force of faculty and
support personnel” [31, p. 17]. Definitions of productivity were variable, but almost always involved attention to faculty-student ratios and administrative efficiencies. One measure of productivity was number of students taught, another was the number of faculty in a particular unit. To achieve greater faculty productivity, almost all administrators agreed that some low-enrollment classes should be eliminated and that small departments should be consolidated. Frequently, administrators spoke as if their decisions were guided by student choice of programs. At Sonoma State, “the president stated, a significant shift in student interest had led to over-staffing in the humanities and social sciences and a shortage of faculty members in such areas as accounting, marketing, computer information, and media studies” [25, p. 4]. At Goucher, the dean spoke of the need “to close empty classrooms and to open new ones” by cutting back or eliminating courses and programs with apparently limited or no appeal to students and at the same time adding courses and programs that were likely to have appeal [26, p. 14].

However, productivity as defined by student choice was far from being the sole criterion for guiding retrenchment. All managers provided ample room for administrative discretion. For example, the first point in “Criteria for Reduction” at the Idaho College of Agriculture was that “reductions will not be across the board; rather, programs, or subprograms will be eliminated” [24, p. 5a]. Although the outer limits of productivity were set by the need to achieve economy and efficiency, within those broad boundaries, productivity was defined to take into account numerous factors: amount of research produced by faculty, ability to attract outside grants [22], quality [24, 29], program “maturity,” [29, p. 2a], and the need “to enlarge [market] niche” [26, p. 14].

Increasing productivity meant internal reallocation of resources, ostensibly to achieve greater quality and maintain competitiveness. In the words of the university attorney for Temple, it was “eminently reasonable for a university to spend its limited money strengthening academic departments in which student enrollments are stable or rising rather than subsidizing the salaries of faculty members who have no students to teach” [31, p. 21]. Through this sort of shifting of resources Presi-

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1Although the AAUP reports gave a great deal of attention to procedural details of retrenchment, which included formal criteria such as mission, institutional missions did not seem to play a great part in the way decisions over what to cut were made. Only three administrators mentioned mission, and then only to list it as one of multiple criteria (Committee A 1982a, Committee A 1983a, Committee A 1984a). No faculty groups made mission a central part of their response to administrators. Perhaps this lack of concern with mission is an artifact of the reports. Perhaps it is due to the broad gauge construction of most mission statements, which make their interpretation highly contested and a source of faculty and administrative conflict during retrenchment.
dent Liacouras hoped to increase Temple's competitiveness, ultimately creating a "world-class" institution [31, p. 20]. Other administrators were more modest. At Idaho, Dean Maynard Miller, discussing long years without faculty raises, said only that "Idaho's elected officials and citizens must understand that UI has to compete nationally; faculty salaries are measured by national standards, not solely within a state framework" [24, p. 5a].

Increased productivity did not mean cost containment. Although administrators recognized that resources were no longer infinite, they wanted new monies as well as savings from retrenchment to be spent on supporting and enhancing the faculty who were retained. As a dean at Idaho said, referring to his refusal to spend a windfall on easing the severance of dismissed faculty, "You can't thin that soup anymore": he believed he had to spend any available money on bringing his remaining faculty up to competitive standards [24, p. 15a].

In the 1980s, intimations of financial crisis consolidated power and authority in institutional administrations. In addressing crises, administrators used the language of productivity, economy and efficiency, and competition, language similar to that used by business leaders. In effect, administrators used crisis to become academic executives, the CEOs of universities. However, administrative invocation of the language of the market and business competition was not elucidated in terms of educational and scholarly goals, nor in terms of institutional missions. That the parallels between colleges and universities, nonprofit organizations concerned with education, and businesses, profit-taking enterprises built through advertising, were less than exact or perhaps inappropriate was apparently not of concern to academic executives. Rather than considering the nature of higher education, administrators were intent on reshaping it. However, administrators were not engaged in retrenchment, the cutting back or reduction of institutions; rather, they were engaged in restructuring, or molding higher education through internal reallocation of resources and procurement of more resources from external sources. In short, academic executives did not want to make do with less, but to spend more on programs they identified as worth strengthening.

Mechanisms for Retrenchment

The major mechanisms that administrators used for retrenchment were program restructuring, strategic planning, and increased use of part-time labor. Faculty were usually unable to avoid the consequences of retrenchment and restructuring because their traditional sources of support — unions, collective bargaining associations, the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB), and the courts — had generally adopted a
pro-management position. Retrenchment mechanisms were often im-
plemented through the use of tactics that stressed job uncertainty and
powerlessness on the part of professional labor. Although personnel pol-
icy often provided for faculty consultation, professors' participation in
retrenchment decisions and strategic planning rarely contributed to
shaping the course of events. The mechanisms and techniques used by
administrators of postsecondary institutions to reshape the professional
labor force loosely resembled those used by corporate CEOs in restruc-
turing blue-collar labor in the 1970s.

Program restructuring. In the 1970s, financial exigency meant that
retrenchment was necessary because an institution as a whole was in
danger of closing [2, 67]. In the 1980s, state boards and institutional
administrators redefined financial exigency to mean that smaller units
or subunits, not institutions, could be retrenched, while the institution as
a whole continued, even prospered. As the AAUP investigating commit-
tee put it when reporting on the Idaho State Board of Higher Educa-
tion's position on retrenchment:

the State Board can declare that a financial exigency exists whenever a re-
duction in funding "threatens the viability of ... one or more programs
... or other distinct units" of a department or "office" of an academic insti-
tution. The institution as a whole need not be threatened, and the threat is
not to the survival of the program or unit but to its "viability," which can
carry several meanings including that which connotes a continued existence
at a desired high level of quality. ... "Consequently, those employees, who
are deemed to be of key importance to the specific program, shall be retained
in preference to other employees, whatever their status. ... A reduction in
force may occur ... by subunit within an agency, institution, office or de-
partment, such as a college, school, academic department, administrative
department, division, office, bureau, discipline, or specialty within a disci-
pine" [23, p. 8a, Committee A investigators added emphasis].

In other words, the state board ruled that administrators need not wait
until it was in trouble to cut a program. They could simply decide that a
program was not viable, no longer worthy of their support. Nor were
administrators any longer bound by notions that, should retrenchment
occur, whole programs must be cut. Instead, they were able to cut selec-
tively within programs, regardless of faculty's tenure status. By claiming
the need to restructure, administrators could cut whom and where they
wished, abrogating contracts and tenure, so long as they proceeded sys-
tematically, following whatever procedures had been set up to guide the
process.

The legal tools available to administrators in the private sector changed
significantly in the 1980s. The Yeshiva decision (1980) undermined collective bargaining in private-sector institutions, removing obstacles to retrenchment and program closing. The legal tools for retrenchment and program closing in public-sector postsecondary institutions did not change in the 1980s; rather, administrators developed greater skill and expertise in using those tools available to them [65]. For example, as the AAUP charged, administrators redefined programs so that program review in essence meant review of all individual faculty members. The skill and expertise developed by administrators was augmented by changes in the broader regulatory climate. The composition of the NLRB changed noticeably during the Reagan and Bush administrations, and decisions tended to favor managers rather than labor. Only one of four appeals to the NLRB by participants in the seventeen retrenchment cases succeeded, and the successful case was heard in 1980.

Nor were unions and faculty collective bargaining associations able to offer much protection to their members. During the 1980s, these organizations were unable to negotiate strong retrenchment clauses [31, 67]. What protection unions did offer were usually centered on seniority. And even though contracts and personnel policies incorporated provisions that honored tenure and length of service, there was enough language providing for exceptions for discretionary managerial judgment as to render meaningless the faculty seniority provisions [67].

Sonoma State illustrates unions’ inability to protect faculty jobs. In the California state system, the bargaining association agreed to accept Teaching Service Areas (TSA) as work units. TSAs were “a designation and a grouping which serves to identify faculty positions for potential layoff”[25, p. 8]. A professor’s TSA was determined by the administration, either in individual negotiations with faculty, or unilaterally. TSAs were not coterminous with departments. For example, in biology, the administration could define a TSA in molecular biology and a TSA in conventional biology, keep the former and eliminate the latter, regardless of the professors’ tenure status. Essentially, the administrative discretion granted by the TSA allowed presidents of unionized institutions in financial difficulty to review each faculty member individually and, regardless of seniority, keep the faculty members he or she wanted.

Retrenchment at Sonoma State also illustrates the use of tactics that heightened anxiety and humiliated faculty. Fifty-three tenured faculty, nearly 20 percent of the full-time faculty, initially received notices that they were on a “jeopardy list,” creating an atmosphere of tension and trepidation [25, p. 4]. Ultimately, only twenty-four were fired. During the several months period that retrenchment decisions were being made,
the status of faculty was fluid, tenuous, uncertain. About 60 percent of
the faculty who received notices continued to teach, but often with re-
duced responsibilities and salaries. Some faculty voluntarily went on
unpaid leave. A number of faculty in areas that were eliminated were
given a chance during a brief time period to negotiate positions with
units not affected by retrenchment. According to the AAUP investigat-
ing committee, the grace period was marked by “a degraded kind of
fawning in the most aggravated cases” as senior faculty tried to keep a
partial hold on their careers by moving to other units [25, p. 11].

Strategic planning. Many of the financial exigency cases had their
origins in the planning process. Strategic planning called for faculty to
respond to a variety of crisis scenarios. Administrators drew on central-
ized services, such as institutional research offices, for projections about
finances, student enrollments, class size, majors and minors, to develop
planning information that provided the basis for program restructuring.
Although projections in higher education have not been notably success-
ful, administrators usually proceeded on the basis of their planning data
and dismissed faculty. Two cases — a private college, and a public re-
search institution — illustrated the part played by strategic planning in
retrenchment, the tactics of fear and uncertainty that often accompanied
strategic planning, and the inability of faculty to make their voices heard
in the process.

The Goucher College case gave an indication of how planning was
used in private-sector postsecondary education [26]. Goucher had
wrestled with declining enrollments and a precarious financial situation
in the 1970s, but had survived by aggressively building endowment and
recruiting students. By the early 1980s, Goucher had turned itself around:
it substantially increased its enrollment, created a budget surplus and
built up a healthy endowment. However, institutional projections for the
1980s indicated that the future was perilous. The president thought
Goucher could survive the 1980s only by getting rid of faculty in low-
enrollment fields and by building new programs more attractive to
students.

The president shared her data with the faculty, who interpreted it dif-
differently. They thought alternatives — retraining, hiring freezes, further
study — other than immediate dismissals were possible. Moreover, they
questioned the administration’s curricular wisdom in making cuts. They
were unhappy with administrative definitions of “efficiency.” “To a great
extent, student enrollments in courses offered by a given department de-
termined its efficiency” [26, p. 15]. Faculty were unhappy with the no-
tion that the popularity of courses, not their educational value, was the
key to professors' productivity. Indeed, when speaking about productivity, a dean told the investigating committee that "a teacher of philosophy must be more interesting than a teacher of accounting," affirming, regardless of subject matter or the degree of learning that took place in their classrooms, that faculty had to attract relatively large numbers of students to avoid being considered for retrenchment [26, p. 22].

Despite faculty requests for reconsideration of enrollment projections and criteria for retrenchment, the president fired five faculty, three of whom were tenured. In so doing, the administration, as the AAUP emphatically pointed out, used "projected financial difficulties at a time of current financial health," as a basis for retrenchment [26, p. 19]. The ability to control scenarios for the future became the basis for making long-term decisions about curriculum.

Although faculty were deeply involved in the planning process and spent enormous amounts of time on committees that fed into the process, their concerns were not heeded. The Goucher trustees made it very clear that the final authority for institutional decision making rested with them and the administrators to whom they delegated power. When the faculty appealed the president's decision to terminate faculty to the board of trustees and asked to review the college's finances in order to assess the president's decisions, the chair of the board of trustees responded to the faculty by saying: "the faculty and its committees do not have the authority to review its (the College's) finances; these are the responsibilities of the trustees" [26, p. 17].

Temple University provided an example parallel to Goucher, but at a large, doctoral-granting public institution [31]. The president at Temple, like Goucher's president, saw himself as addressing the future with his plans for faculty terminations. The dismissals at Temple were not made to forestall an impending financial crisis, but to deal with projected declines in student enrollment before these became a problem. The AAUP, the Temple faculty bargaining agent, argued that faculty should be retained so long as financial crisis was not imminent. The administration disagreed.

At issue was control of resource allocation. The AAUP wanted to use resources to save full-time faculty positions through reassignment and retraining; the administration wanted to use resources to build programs in areas that it thought would increase the prestige of the university. The administration successfully claimed the short-term authority to decide which units would grow and which would contract; thirty-four faculty were fired.

At Temple, as at many other colleges and universities, personnel poli-
cies required that faculty be involved in the planning process. Administrators usually honored the letter but not the spirit of these provisions. In the Temple case, the faculty anticipated the president’s concern with declining enrollments and developed an alternative plan. In the college that was most affected by the dismissals, the faculty devoted a great deal of time to developing a scheme to reduce full-time faculty through attrition, judicious reduction of nontenured lines, and reassignment of faculty outside of the department of appointment. Between 1979, when the faculty plan was put into action, and 1982, the college managed an 11 percent faculty reduction, although student credit hours dropped only 4 percent. These changes were not enough to forestall further retrenchment.

The Temple contract provided for faculty consultation with regard to retrenchment and for retraining and reassignment of retrenched faculty to other programs. A number of faculty slated for retrenchment at Temple claimed that they were able to teach in general education or in remedial programs, areas in which the university was currently hiring. Indeed, several of the faculty were already regularly teaching courses in these areas. However, the administration apparently did not want to assign (relatively) highly paid, full-time faculty to low-cost slots. Instead, the administration, in token gestures to contract language calling for reassignment, brought to the attention of faculty slated for retrenchment:

either assignments in the university-wide programs, with acceptance of appointment conditioned upon waiving of their rights under academic tenure, or posts far removed from their areas of professional competence. Professor Adams [German and Slavic Languages] shared with the investigating committee notices sent to her by the administration for work as a clerk, carpenter, electrician, and medical technician. As to circulating resumes, the administration distributed them without prior knowledge of the faculty members, who received letters of rejection for positions for which they had not applied [31, p. 25].

The administration did not want to reassign or retrain, but to restructure the faculty.

Strategic planning became a permanent process of institutional evaluation. As Judge Frank A. Kaufman, a member of Goucher College’s Board of Trustees said:

“We cannot now anticipate what strategies that planning for predicted or projected deficits will suggest. We must accept that future circumstances may require a wide range of actions — cost cutting, the relocation of financial resources, the reassignment of faculty to new programs, or the reallocation of faculty and administrative positions”[26, p. 24a].

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Strategic planning shifted the locus of decision making in universities and colleges from the faculty to the administration. Because strategic planning dealt with the institution as a whole, the various parts — programs, departments or colleges — were no longer able to claim the authority or expertise necessary to insist on faculty lines for their areas. Generally administrators used the planning process to restructure, re-shaping their institutions to improve their institutional profiles vis-à-vis peer institutions. In so doing, they severely limited the faculty participation in governance and undermined the concept of job security or tenure.

Part-time labor. In retrenchment cases, part-time academic labor was seen by administrators as an important means of cost containment. Faculty salaries were an institution’s largest fixed cost. Part-time professional labor was paid a fraction of full-time faculty costs, received few or no benefits, and could be laid on or off to meet fluctuating institutional requirements. Part-time professional workers usually performed what were regarded as the most onerous institutional tasks — teaching and grading of undergraduate students.

In the 1970s, none of the financial exigency cases reported by the AAUP involved the use of part-time labor [75]. In the 1980s, six (35 percent) of the seventeen financial exigency cases involved explicit discussions of substitution of part-time for full-time faculty labor. Although the overall proportion of all part-time faculty positions increased relatively little from 1975 (32.3 percent) to 1985 (36.3 percent), one of the administrations’ responses to the financial crises of the early 1980s was greater use of part-timers [55]. Two cases — Eastern Oregon State College and the Metropolitan Community Colleges (Missouri) — illustrated the way this trend played out in retrenchment cases.

At Eastern Oregon State College, program restructuring raised the possibility of the institution’s rehiring fired full-time faculty on a part-time basis [23]. Professor Carol E. Rathe, Music Education, was one of four faculty who were terminated during program reduction. Initially, she was kept on as a part-time tenured faculty member. In other words, she was paid for a fraction of her tenured appointment. She was then reduced to a “‘teach only’ ’’ basis [23, p. 3a]. This new status meant that she was re-hired to teach part of her former load, but on a per-course basis rather than at a fraction of her former salary. The per-course cost was much lower than a fraction of a tenured professor’s salary. The rationale for the very low “teach only” salary was that she was not engaged in student advising, curriculum planning, supervising, and research.

The Oregon administration wanted the option of treating all positions
like Rathe's. According to an administrative memorandum circulated in the Oregon system:

the appointment of a tenured faculty member who had both teaching responsibilities and responsibilities involving student counselling, committee work, research, public outreach, etc., could be terminated on grounds of "program reduction" and that same person could then be offered a "restructured" position. The new position would be much like a part-time position, as it would eliminate requirement or credit for nonteaching duties such as research or advising or committee work and would assign a lesser FTE for what would then be exclusively teaching ("teach only") duties. . . . If such "restructuring" is not permitted a college or university will be hampered unnecessarily in its range of choices [23, p. 3a].

The administration wanted the flexibility to try to keep as part-timers the same faculty it had initially hired on a full-time basis. Essentially, the administration was asking for "give-backs" greater than any required of blue-collar workers in the 1970s. However, the position taken by the administration precipitated a faculty revolt, several hearing committees, at both the institution and the state-system level, and a decision against rehiring part-timers on a per-course basis as well as against tenure for faculty whose workload was less than 1.0 FTE.

The Eastern Oregon State faculty tried to preserve the job security of those faculty who were not the targets of program reduction by constraining the ability of the administration to use former full-timers as part-timers. In the course of the struggle, Professor Rathe lost the remnants of her job. Although the faculty prevented give-backs in the form of restructuring positions so that full-time jobs became part-time, they did not prevent further job loss [45].

At the Metropolitan Community Colleges (Missouri) the administration tried to increase faculty productivity by "speed-ups" — eliminating faculty, increasing the teaching load of the remaining faculty, and increasing the number of part-time faculty [28]. Faced with a projected shortfall, the administration used strategic planning in an attempt to change the Master Plan ratio of full- to part-time faculty. The trustees and administrators changed institutional "staffing parameters" so that full-time faculty, who taught 80 percent of the credit hours, would teach 65 percent, thereby

reducing the size of the full time faculty by adopting the standard of an average teaching load of 725 credit hours with a maximum of 65 percent of the credit hours taught by full time faculty members. An estimate of 190,000 credit hours for the 1979–80 academic year was accordingly divided by 725, producing the number of 625 full time equivalent faculty, 65 percent of
which would total 170 full time faculty positions. Since the budget provided for 219 full time faculty positions, the result would have been the lay-off of 49 full time members of the faculty [28, p. 24a].

The faculty responded by using the governance structure to oppose the administration. The faculty examined the documents and statistics offered by the administration, questioned the projections, generated their own statistics, and offered alternative projections. The faculty and the AAUP investigating team argued that the administration had sufficient funds to avoid retrenchment, had they not put hundreds of thousands of dollars into construction funds to match state or federal funds, should these become available, into additional construction projects, and into enrollment reserve and contingency funds.

During the protracted struggle, lay-off notices were issued to twenty-one full-time tenured faculty. Several of those faculty, in an attempt to protect their jobs, began working part-time on a substantially lower salary scale. A number of new part-timers were hired, and "overloads were assigned in most of the disciplines from which tenured faculty members had either been placed on layoff or, while continuing to teach, had been removed from tenured status" [28, p. 28a]. Ultimately, the board and the administration compromised with the faculty on a ratio of 65 percent, and only eight faculty were fired.

Although faculty contained administrators' attempts to convert numerous full-time faculty members into part-time faculty, they were not able to contain the administrations' increased use of part-timers. The increased use of part-timers often meant speed-ups for full-time faculty. Because part-time faculty were usually hired on a per-course basis, full-time faculty had to give more time to advising students, planning the curriculum, and supervising part-timers. Every time ratios of part- to full-time faculty increased, full-time faculty workload increased. The relation of part- to full-time professional labor probably heightened antagonism between the two groups and certainly increased the distance between them, with full-time faculty attempting to codify their rights and privileges in relation to part-time faculty. Indeed, these cases suggested the development of a two-tier labor force, one full-time, the other part-time. The full-time tier had benefits and a degree of job security and was at one and the same time supported and threatened by part-timers, who made full-timers' workload possible even as they increased that workload and constituted a reserve labor pool, implicitly challenging the continued security of full-time jobs.

Analytically, the three mechanisms — program reduction, strategic planning, and use of part-time labor — were separable, but in practice
they were often inextricable, part of general processes of restructuring the professional labor force. The restructuring of the professional labor force that began in the 1980s in many ways paralleled the restructuring of the blue-collar labor force that occurred in the 1970s. It derived its momentum and authority from the conservative political resurgence that began in the mid-1970s, and coalesced during the Reagan and Bush administrations. The conservative political resurgence privileged managers and eroded worker and employee rights. As blue-collar workers' morale was lowered through give-backs, speed-ups, and job loss, so too was that of professional labor. Specific tactics, such as jeopardy lists, prolonged periods of uncertainty with regard to job status, and erosion of faculty participation in governance further lowered professorial morale. The emergence of a two-tier work force exacerbated faculty insecurity.

Patterns of Restructuring

The fields that were cut in the 1980s were the humanities, fine arts, social sciences, and education, fields that lost enrollments from the early 1970s through 1983–84. Generally, these cuts were presented by administrators as a rational response to student choice, which had shifted from arts and sciences to more vocational areas. This interpretation of institutional behavior has several problems.

First, the need for faculty in the various fields was calculated by administrators (and researchers) by majors, usually defined by number of graduates in a particular major [14]. Number of graduates does not address the course-taking patterns of students. Most institutional distribution requirements call for a relatively high number of courses in the humanities and social sciences, but do not require students in the social sciences and humanities to take courses in the professional schools. As a result, the number of courses taken by students in humanities and social sciences has probably remained fairly high. For example, the Stanford curriculum study showed that humanities majors declined by 25 percent between 1975–76 and 1981–82, but that students continued to take as many humanities courses in 1981–82 as they had in 1975–76 [12]. In other words, cuts were made in fields that continued to serve large numbers of students, if not as majors, then as service courses.

Second, strategic planning, a central component of retrenchment, did not adequately anticipate growth. Planners seem not to have figured gender into their calculations. Women began attending postsecondary institutions in greater numbers than men and continued to concentrate in fields that had traditionally attracted them: arts and science, fine arts, education, and home economics [60].
In the AAUP sample, where field is known, 72.9 percent of the firings occurred in the social sciences, liberal arts, and education (see table 1). Another 17.6 percent occurred in agriculture and industrial technology programs. Home economics, an almost exclusively female field, was housed in schools of agriculture and accounts for a number of the dismissals, although the exact number is not clear. If half of the agriculture cuts were in home economics, the percentage of dismissals in fields with a high proportion of women students was 81.7.

According to the National Center for Educational Statistics,

The pattern of bachelor's degrees by field of study has shifted significantly in recent years. The pace of growth in such areas as business and management has subsided and declines are significant in male majority fields such as engineering and computer and information sciences. The number of degrees conferred in business and management rose by 42 percent between 1977–78 and 1982–83, but by only 7 percent during the following 5-year period. Engineering and engineering technologies rose 60 percent between 1977–78 and 1982–83 but then posted a small decline of .5 percent between 1982–83 and 1987–88. Computer and information sciences had been showing spectacular growth, but dropped 18 percent between 1985–86 and 1987–88. In contrast, some fields such as social sciences and letters that had been declining began to increase. For example, the number of degrees conferred in social sciences dropped by 16 percent between 1977–78 and 1982–83, but rose

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
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<td>Fields Retrenched</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Number of Faculty Cut</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allied Health</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalism, Communication</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life 4 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical 1 (0.5%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social science</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Industrial Technology</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts*</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                           | 196**                 | 99.8       |

SOURCE: Data were compiled from the dismissals listed by Committee A "Academic Freedom and Tenure" in Academe 1980–1990.  
*Includes humanities and fine arts.  
**The data include all instances in which colleges or universities issued termination notices, regardless of whether or not faculty were finally terminated. The total number of faculty who received notice was 221. The discipline or field of the faculty was unknown in 25 cases (11.3 percent) of the total. Table 1 reports only those faculty where field was known.

which would total 170 full time faculty positions. Since the budget provided for 219 full time faculty positions, the result would have been the lay-off of 49 full time members of the faculty [28, p. 24a].

The faculty responded by using the governance structure to oppose the administration. The faculty examined the documents and statistics
by 5 percent over the next 5 years. Letters declined by 10 percent between 1977–78 and 1982–83, then increased by 21 percent between 1982–83 and 1987–88. Psychology fell by 9 percent during the first 5-year period and rose by 11 percent between 1982–83 and 1987–88. In 1987–88, the number of degrees conferred in education rose for the first time since 1972–73. To some extent, these shifts during the 1982–83 and 1987–88 period highlight the increasing female majority on college campuses by reflecting significant increases in predominantly female fields and decreases in predominantly male fields (tables 225, 243, 245, 246, 247, 258, and 260) [61, p. 161].

Although the greatest growth in the 1980s occurred in fields with large numbers of women, faculty in the AAUP sample were cut in inverse relation to growth. The higher the number of women graduating with BAs in 1990, the greater the cuts in faculty in the mid-1980s. In 1990 women accounted for 76.9 percent of the graduates in education, for 66.7 percent in liberal arts, and for 43.8 percent in social science [61, table 224].

Given the importance of the strategic planning process and projections for the future in many of the AAUP cases, why were cuts made in what would prove to be growth areas? Unfortunately, the AAUP data do not permit me to address this question directly. Because I think the question is so important — is planning a tool to manage the future rationally or to protect the privileged? — I drew on scholarship that rests on data indirectly related to my question to speculate about why the planning process failed to anticipate the immediate future.

As indicated earlier, academic executives used a rhetoric similar to that of corporate CEOs, a rhetoric that stressed crises, the need for tough decisions, increased productivity, and maintenance of competitiveness. This was the rhetoric of the private sector, of markets, a rhetoric that privileged fields such as business and management, engineering and computer and information sciences, fields that were popularly associated with potential for market growth and rescue from recession. Like market rhetoric generally, this discourse glossed over the complex relationship between state and civil society, locating agency in civil society and overlooking the state's part in maintaining growth in privileged fields. Engineering, physical science, computer science, and information science were all fields that depended heavily on mission agencies for funding, and often for jobs. For example, the strongest predictor of job demand in science and engineering was Department of Defense spending [52, 56]. Administrators generally seemed to neglect the subtleties of relations between state and civil society and relied instead on a simple but popular rhetoric that equated productivity with the private sector. Reliance on that rhetoric valorized enrollment patterns of the past and probably obscured new trends.
Faculty in the various fields contributed to academic executives' rhetoric. Physical scientists had associated growth and discovery in science with economic productivity and general prosperity since the 1920s [46]. In the 1980s, scientists continued this association, linking increased science funding to greater economic growth [49]. Indeed, scientists forcefully made the case that their discoveries, particularly in the realm of patents and processes, would contribute to the growth of high technology that would return America to global market dominance [69, 70]. Scientists' rhetoric articulated with administrators', tightening the links between fields such as science and engineering and the higher education discourse on productivity, as well as with the broader conservative discourse on productivity.

Conversely, fields such as the humanities and fine arts generally did not structure their discourse to intersect with that of academic executives' rhetoric on productivity. Faculty in these fields could have easily made the case that their fields increased productivity in high technology, high export areas such as entertainment and media, for example, but they did not. Instead, new fields, such as communications and media arts, used the techniques and methods of the humanities, fine arts, and social sciences with a vocational rhetoric, and grew rapidly in the early 1980s. In other words, faculty in some fields, for whatever reasons, chose not to try to position themselves close to the market. These fields were often the ones that were cut.

Some fields tried to position themselves close to the market, but were unsuccessful. Education was cut more deeply than almost any other field in the 1980s. Perhaps not coincidentally, education was the enterprise with the highest level of unionization in the 1980s. Education as a field was singled out by the Reagan and Bush administrations as a signifier of state agency incompetence. The ineptitude of educators put the "nation at risk" [62]. Privatization, allowing the free play of market forces through parental "choice," was the answer provided by conservative politicians to remedy educators' failure. This formulation of the problem overlooked the complex relation between civil society and the state with regard to stratification and certification and glossed over the continued educational dependence of "choice" plans on the state for funding of private schools. Instead, education was definitively associated with state welfare functions that were expensive and unable to accomplish their ends, making impossible association between education and productivity via human capital formation. No matter how desperately faculty in education tried to position themselves close to the market, the political attack on the field preempted such a location.

The social relations of faculty in fields that were not retrenched and
those that were deeply cut were markedly different. Faculty who were not retrenched (science, engineering, medicine, business, law) were generally in fields that were close to major mission agencies (Department of Defense, Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Association, the National Institutes of Health), had powerful external constituencies (the nuclear and defense industries, the American Medical Association), were routes to highly paid careers (business, law) that enabled graduates to donate monies to colleges and universities [43, 56]. Faculty who were retrenched (education, humanities, social science, fine arts, home economics) were not close to the mission agencies that provided the greatest amounts of money to higher education, did not have powerful constituencies, were not gateways to highly paid careers, and did not have graduates who donated large amounts of money to colleges and universities [65]. Average faculty salaries in four-year institutions in education, fine arts, and humanities were $40,000 and below in 1989 dollars, while faculty in business, engineering, and health sciences were above $40,000, with the average in health science as high as $61,800 [60, chart 2:30].

In terms of social characteristics, the majority of faculty in retrenched fields were male, but these fields were more likely to have a higher percentage of women and minorities than non-retrenched fields. Although the number of women faculty in social sciences, education, humanities, and fine arts increased between 1975 and 1985, the increase was not great given that the overall percentage of women faculty in postsecondary education increased only from 23.2 percent to 25.8 percent. However, the presence of women in these fields increased:

...the increasing presence of women in academia has been most striking in nontenure-track part-time faculty positions. Between 1975 and 1985, the net addition of women to this category (32,292) was more than three times as great as that for men (9,838), and the share of these jobs held by women rose from 33.3 to 41.5 percent [55, p. 669].

In terms of profile within institutions, the fields that were retrenched probably had the greatest presence of women faculty, although many of these were off track. Moreover, gender figured foremost among the social characteristics of students in retrenched fields. In education, humanities, fine arts, social sciences, and home economics, the majority of students were female, with the exception of the social sciences, at 43.8 percent women [60, table 224]. In sum, retrenched fields were those that were most likely to provide career possibilities for women in academe and in the professions.

Market arguments often are used to explain the disparities of pay and
privilege between majority male and female fields. The market argument generally assumes that the market is gender neutral and that field, not gender of applicant or job holder, shapes a graduate or faculty member’s chances. In other words, graduates and faculty in majority male fields are in short supply, and there is a greater demand for them inside and outside the academy. To take advantage of the market, women need to change their fields.

Market arguments are problematic in several regards. They overlook persistent findings of gender segregation within fields dominated by men [70, 81, 24]. Market arguments overlook the lack of fit between field at time of graduation and career after graduation; in many cases, a graduate’s field has little bearing on the area in which she is subsequently employed [8]. Market arguments do not attend to the role of the state in shaping supply (fellowships, research monies, equipment subsidies) and demand (high state expenditures over long periods of time in fields such as aerospace, computers, electronics, communications technologies, and various fields in medicine). Nor do they attend to the ways in which forces external to the product (the skill and expertise embodied in the person of the graduate or faculty member) shape markets. For example, lobbying efforts mounted by powerful professional organizations, such as the AMA, by science policy makers, such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Association of American Universities, and by external constituencies, such as the defense and nuclear energy industries, result in direct and indirect subsidies for particular markets.

Even if market arguments were sufficient explanation for disparities in pay and privilege between majority male and female fields, they would not necessarily explain retrenchment patterns. Although fields such as education and nursing may not have demand as robust or pay as high as science or medicine, there is still a very strong demand for certified graduates in these fields, and though the pay may not compare with that of scientists or physicians, it is nonetheless quite high, when compared to the pay of adult Americans generally, and excellent, when compared to the pay of adult women. Fields such as the humanities, social sciences, and fine arts might not have as clear occupational demands as education and nursing, but graduates in these fields are very often able to use their degrees to negotiate successful careers in business, and with various state bureaucracies, or as preparation for an MA degree in a more specifically career-oriented field [33]. The fields that are being retrenched all have a good supply of students, some have strong market demand, and many have strong market potential.
When market is not invoked as an explanation for disparities in pay, privilege, and vulnerability to retrenchment, prestige is often used. The university, a nonprofit organization, is seen as intent on maximizing prestige, not position in relation to the market [13]. The prestige of a given field is often explained by degree of scientific rigor, as exemplified by consensus with regard to field boundaries, theory, problem, and method [9]. This explanation has several problems. Many of the fields that are high in terms of scientific rigor are the same fields that are high in terms of pay, ability to generate external funds, likelihood of powerful constituencies and high-paying careers. While prestige and consensus could explain pay, external funds, powerful constituencies and promising career routes, any or all of the others could explain prestige and consensus. The direction that a break in this circular argument might take is suggested by the fact that fields that gained greatly in terms of scientific rigor — for example, the "semi-professions," nursing, education, and social work — have not necessarily increased in prestige [38]. Deconstructed, the prestige argument is code for preserving existing hierarchies of status and privilege within higher education.

In sum, there is a significant power differential between the fields that were privileged and those that were retrenched. In vulgar materialist terms, fields that were best able to provide external resources, resources above and beyond fixed formula allotments, whether through grants or gifts, were least likely to be cut [43]. In social constructionist terms, those fields that were able to represent themselves as close to the market were least likely to be cut. In terms of social characteristics of clientele, fields with majority male student bodies were unlikely to be cut, and fields with a high proportion of female students, especially fields unlikely to bring in external funds and unwilling or unable to position themselves close to the market, were more likely to be cut.

Conclusion: Restructuring Higher Education

The AAUP retrenchment cases of the 1980s suggest that postsecondary education is being restructured rather than retrenched. Resources are not simply being cut back, they are being reallocated within the university, and new resources are being concentrated on the same areas that are already resource rich. The university that emerges from this process might well look quite different than the university that we know now.

Authority for restructuring was concentrated on management, reflecting the general privileging of management at the expense of labor during the Reagan and Bush administrations. University managers used
a rhetoric similar to that of corporate CEOs; they justified their cuts in terms of crisis, the need for greater productivity and greater competitiveness. In practice, the mechanisms and tactics they used in cutting were similar to those used by corporate CEOs with blue-collar workers: discrediting unions, speed-ups, give-backs, increased use of part-time labor. These developments generally undermined faculty participation in governance and faculty authority over the direction of the curriculum.

Retrenchment and the use of the mechanisms and tactics discussed did not fall evenly across the university. Those fields able to position themselves close to the market and locate themselves in broad political discourse on productivity were generally not cut, whereas those that were unwilling or unable to participate in the discourse of the market, productivity, and competitiveness were cut. The relation of various fields to the market was socially constructed, although within firm political economic boundaries. In other words, some faculty and fields, although quite distant from the market in terms of product development and private sector sales, were nonetheless able to claim a close relationship. The faculty and fields that were successful were usually those associated with established external funding structures or with careers outside the university that were able to command high salaries.

The fields that were cut became “have-not” fields within the university. They were generally fields marked by low faculty pay, high student loads, at least after 1984, and high use of part-time or off-track labor. These fields had a relatively high presence of women faculty, although the women were frequently at junior levels or in off-track or part-time positions. The clientele of these fields had an unusually high proportion of women students. The faculty in these areas, whether on or off-track, whether male or female, seem to become the second tier of a two-tier labor force within the university. The development of a two-tier labor force is very likely to undermine collegial structures and relationships because differentials in power between “haves” and “have-nots” turn governance for the university as a whole into an exercise in conflict over unequal resources.

Although the AAUP data were rich and suggestive, they were somewhat problematic. The institutions in the AAUP sample became cases because they involved violations of academic due process that were so substantial that they impelled faculty to seek redress. Many institutions may not exhibit these pathologies, although a number of studies, usually written from a faculty rather than an administrative perspective, suggest otherwise [42, 45]. Regardless of the strengths and weaknesses of the AAUP data set, data dealing with retrenchment in the 1990s needs to be developed.
The 1990s have been marked by recession, the harbinger of restructuring. In 1991–92, roughly two-thirds of public research universities faced substantial cuts [3]. Private institutions — Stanford, Columbia — are also beginning the process. Newspaper accounts indicate that they are following a pattern similar to the one that I have described here. For example, a number of library schools — Columbia University, University of Chicago, University of Southern California, Emory University — were closed in the past few years, despite high enrollments and good job prospects for graduates [19]. The University of Oregon cut most of its School of Education, although enrollments were high and job prospects strong [45]. However, newspaper accounts and occasional state documents are less than satisfactory data sources. To comprehend restructuring fully, we need to develop systematic and longitudinal data sources that treat the phenomenon.

Data are important because restructuring is probably here to stay until universities are somewhat differently configured. Societal resources are limited. Postsecondary education cannot expand indefinitely and expect an ever increasing share of state and federal budgets. Productivity, however defined, is a problem. Change in the balance of fields within institutions is probably necessary. There is no reason to think that disciplines established in the last quarter of the nineteenth century have an inalienable right to continue forever, especially given the growth of knowledge and the changes in societal needs for knowledge. Nor is specialization, the traditional solution to change in the university and a form of proliferation of established structures, necessarily an appropriate vehicle for change.

Although I am suggesting that we cannot return to a golden age in postsecondary education, I have taken great pains to point out that the pattern of restructuring that began to emerge in the 1980s is probably not adequate to the needs of the future. That pattern loosely paralleled restructuring of the broader political economy. The conservative restructuring of the economy was marked by immense military expenditures leading to rapid growth of the federal deficit, the financial industries crises, the health care crises, emphasis on short-term speculative profits rather than long-term investment in manufacturing growth and infrastructure, massive environmental problems, and recession. Heavy university funding of fields that turn out professors who depend on continuation of these practices to secure their market share may not be conducive to creating patterns of economic growth able to sustain postsecondary education.

Looking to the future from a postmodernist perspective, I see no easy solutions to our present difficulties. I see neither science nor any particu-
lar set of class, gender, or ethnic minority actors as likely to rescue us from our dilemmas. Perhaps the best that universities can do, as one of the many state mediators between individuals and labor markets, is to try to continue offering preparation for a variety of occupations and professions, including those that serve a range of middle incomes and some of which have women and minorities as majority clientele, rather than concentrating resources heavily on fields defined as high in prestige. If institutions of higher education do not pursue such policies, they will undermine their own raison d’être. Higher education received support for great growth during the 1960s and 1970s because it offered routes to social mobility to all entrants. If participants experience a great difference between haves and have-nots and if graduates are unable to realize promised rewards, as citizens they are unlikely to support postsecondary education generously, and in the final analysis, higher education, whether under public or private control, depends on the state, directly and indirectly, whether for student and facilities grants or maintenance of the research establishment.

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